

HEADQUARTERS
2D BATTALION, 9TH ARTILLERY
"THE MIGHTY NINTH"
APO US Forces 96225


TLDAB-3

SUBJECT: Operation Garfield

TO: Commanding Officer
3d Brigade, 25th Inf Div
ATTN: S3
APO US Forces 96225

18 Apr 66

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July 9 '63*



1. After action report for Operation Garfield (25 Feb - 31 Mar 66).
2. Unit commanders engaged in the operation:
 - a. Battalion Commander: LTC Saul Jackson.
 - b. HH&S Btry - Capt Carl Morin.
 - c. A Btry - Capt John Ferguson.
 - d. B Btry - Capt Fredrick Rice.
 - e. C Btry - Capt John Oliver.
3. Supporting forces: During the operation this unit was supported by CH 47 helicopters from the 228th Transportation Battalion. There were twelve airlifts of the firing batteries during the operation. This was our first experience in air lifting with the CH 47's and with little or no training the batteries were able to quickly learn the procedures. The support from the 228th Transportation Battalion was outstanding.
4. Mission: Direct support 3d Brigade.
5. Concept: Priority of fires from a minimum of one 105-mm howitzer battery was given to each infantry battalion for all search and destroy operations.
6. Execution: The firing batteries were able to move to position areas to support the infantry units by either motor convoy or helicopter airlift. This was done in all areas but one. In the one instance a battery was not in position to support the battalion. This occurred during the period 17 - 19 Mar 66 when the 1/14th Infantry made the foot march. It was requested that the battery be airlifted out of the area to provide deception.

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7. Results from artillery fire: 10 KIA(BC), 5 KIA(est), 14 WIA.
8. Missions fired: Registrations - 63, H&I's - 1925, destruction - 3, illumination - 54, preparations - 31, will adjust - 61, other - 148.
9. Artillery rounds fired: HE - 10,627; illumination - 430; WP - 1,093; smoke - 194; total - 12,344.
10. Administrative matters.
 - a. Supply:
 - (1) A double basic load of artillery ammunition was maintained within the battalion. This proved to be adequate and will be used again for future operations.
 - (2) Resupply of artillery ammunition to units located in isolated areas had to be accomplished by CH 47. To resupply by HU1-D would require an excessive number of sorties.
 - b. Maintenance: Command emphasis and continuous technical inspection of equipment was particularly evident in the performance of the motor vehicles. During the several motor marches that were made, one of which was one hundred miles, none of the battalion vehicles broke down.
 - c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation: After casualties were evacuated it was often difficult to determine where they were located or their final disposition.
 - d. Transportation: Initial move by C 130 to Ban Me Thout was satisfactory except for some delays caused by last minute changes in scheduling.
 - e. Communications: The complete change over from the old series of radios to the new series was accomplished during the operation without any problems. The new radios have proven to be very reliable and have significantly increased this battalion's communications capability.
 - f. Medical evaluation: Command emphasis on personal hygiene and frequent inspection of battery mess halls and battery sanitation facilities were instrumental in the extremely low sickness rate experienced by this unit.
11. Special equipment and techniques.
 - a. Movement by CH 47 helicopter requires nets and slings that are not organic to this unit or to the helicopter units. These items

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have been requisitioned. When they are obtained, the time required to move a battery will be reduced by approximately one third.

b. The "Beehive" round for the 105 howitzer is extremely effective for perimeter defense. At the present time none are available in this battalion. G-3, USARV stated during the artillery conference at Tan Son Nhut on 13 Apr 66, that these rounds will be issued this battalion in June 1966.

12. Commander's analysis:

a. The experience gained by this unit during Operation Garfield has improved our ability to support search and destroy operations conducted by the maneuver elements. It should be noted that the lessons learned by this unit are applicable to any type operation. Some of these are:

(1) Continuous need for an observation helicopter for reconnaissance of an LZ with infantry personnel.

(2) The requirement for the battery commander to make the reconnaissance of an LZ with infantry personnel.

(3) The artillery LO must be airborne during a landing so that he can control the artillery preparation, the shifting of fires and the airstrike.

(4) All incoming aircraft must call the artillery FDC for clearance to land and landing instructions in that battery's area.

(5) An air FO is required to be airborne during daylight hours.

(6) Personnel requesting fire support must give target information and location and not request specific fire support means.

b. Civil affairs/psychological warfare:

(1) The battalion S-5 actively participated in civil affairs activities in villages near each position area. He not only made friends with the villagers but also gained valuable intelligence information and initiated several civic action projects. The assistant communication officer initially performed the duties of S-5 as an additional duty. However, the S-5 duties have since become a full time requirement.

(2) The psychological warfare team that was initially attached was helpful but did not remain with the unit throughout the operation. The loss of this team did not materially degrade the civic action program of the battalion.

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13. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That when fire support is required from the Brigade FSC or from an infantry battalion AFSC, the nature of target and location be given rather than the requesting agency calling for a specific type of fire support.

b. That a system be adopted whereby all aircraft coming into an LZ where artillery is located call the fire direction center for information on artillery firing and landing instructions.

c. That a more positive means of control be established on personnel that are medically evacuated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MILTON C. THOMASON
1st Lt, Arty
Asst Adjutant